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THE COMING REVOLUTION IN PUBLIC
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT
Donald H. Wollett*
James Conant has commented on ·what he views as "concurrent educational revolutions"-changes in methods of instruction, in curriculum emphasis, and in public school financing-which
portend radical revision in the methods of determining educational
policy. 1 However, thus far neither Dr. Conant nor any other observer
of similar stature has addressed himself seriously to a fourth educational revolution-in-the-making: the direct involvement of teachers,
through structured collective negotiations, in the management of
public elementary and secondary school systems. This Article will
focus on that coming revolution.

D

R.

I.

THE

Locus

OF DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY

IN PUBLIC EDUCATION

Local lay school boards and the superintendents who act as their
chief executive officers function within prescribed fiscal limitations
and are subject to peripheral legislative directives on such matters
as minimum salaries, teacher retirement, and tenure.2 They are
often motivated by the availability of federal and foundation grants,
and are responsive to the requirements of regional accrediting
agencies and the supervision of state boards of education and state
superintendents. However, local boards and superintendents have
a broad residual discretion to manage the public schools under their
jurisdiction. "Within this wide domain of authority they are the
principal makers and administrators of educational policy, carrying
-0n the uniquely American tradition of decentralized "civilian" control of the public educational enterprise.
Teacher organizations and teachers of education-the groups
which together form "the educational establishment" 3-historically
have been able to exert heavy influence on state boards of education,
• Professor of Law, University of California (Davis). A.B. 1941, University of
Chicago; LL.B. 1942, University of Indiana. The author is a former partner in a law
firm which served as labor counsel for the National Education Association.-Ed.
1. J. CONANT, SHAPING EDUCATIONAL POLICY 2-8 (1964).
2. See generally Rehmus, Constraints on Local Governments and Public Employee
Bargaining, 67 MICH. L. REV. 919 (1969).
3. J. CONANT, supra note 1, at 16-48.
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state superintendents, and regional accrediting agencies. They have
effectively mounted and exerted "lobbying" pressures on state legislatures and, in recent years at least, on Congress. However, until very
recently teacher organizations have had little involvement in local
school administration or in the policy decisions of local school boards
and superintendents.
The triad of public school administration is that school boards
make policy, superintendents administer policy, and teachers teach.
Since the statement embodies some truth, it cannot fairly be characterized as mythology. However, for one who is seeking a real understanding of who does what in the management and operation of a
local school system, the statement is grossly misleading. The fact is
that school boards frequently perform administrative as well as
policy-making functions, usually in response to community pressures
and often to the dismay of the local superintendents. For example, it
is not uncommon for a school board to direct a change in the
assigned textbook for a specific course. Moreover, superintendents
often transcend their administrative roles in order to make educational policy. Many school board members, who know very little
about the particulars of educational programming, are willing, if
not relieved, to follow the judgment of professionally trained school
superintendents on such matters as curriculum planning.4
Not only do school boards and superintendents frequently get
into each other's business, but they are also not reluctant to intrude
themselves directly into the teaching process itself-often to the
detriment of academic freedom. 5 School boards and superintendents
have considered it perfectly legitimate, for instance, to exercise strict
control over the teacher's behavior, his method of instruction, or
both. In part, this reflects the tradition of emphasizing the role of
the teacher as an "employee" of the "community" to which the
4. This observation is based upon a number of conversations which this writer
has had with school board members. For example, during a conversation at the Conference on Negotiations (California Teachers Association, Spring 1964) Mr. J. Edgar
Benton of the Denver Board of Education stated:
·we school board people are comfortable only when we are dealing with things
with which we have had experience. We look forward to such agenda items as
a bond issue or the purchase of a school bus for then we are on familiar terrain.
If, on the other hand, the question before us involves educational programming,
we are uneasy about our competence and willing, if not relieved, to follow the
superintendent.
5. When interviewed, one school board member in a New England state remarked:
"Sure, we believe in academic freedom for our teachers. But this isn't New York. And
that high school art teacher can't expect to get away with showing his class dirty pictures by some off-beat Frenchman."
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board and the superintendent are "responsible." Thus, teachers, individually and collectively, are expected to tailor their expectations
and behavior to fit the limits tolerable to the community in which
they are employed-or, more precisely, to organized groups which
have political leverage within that community. If the teachers exceed
those limits, the school board and the superintendent will predictably
stand with the community rather than with the faculty, even though
the quality of education may suffer as a result. The rationale for
choosing sides in this way is self-preservation: the community not
only pays taxes to support the public educational establishment, but
also retains the ultimate power to dismiss unresponsive boards of
education and superintendents. Educational policy that is set in
response to such pressure from community groups often does not
satisfy the legitimate educational needs of the community's children. 6
II.

THE PROFESSIONAL STATUS OF THE
PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHER

There has been a substantial effort in the United States to
improve the quality of education by raising the requirements for
admission to, and advancement in, the teaching profession. While
some critics have argued that these standards are too parochial and
too mechanical in conception and application,7 there is little doubt
that the over-all effort has been successful. Teachers as a whole are
now better qualified to serve the welfare of their special clientele
than they have ever been before. We expect more from teachers today
than at any time in the past, we assign them more responsibility, and
we are more critical if their level of achievement-as measured by
that of their students--does not reach our expectations.
However, teachers do not have authority within local school sys6. Benton, Human Relations-Impasse-School Boards, in REPORT OF NORTHWEST
INSTITUTE ON NEGOTIATIONS AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 253, 263 (Eastern Washington State
College &: United States Office of Education 1968).
Boards of Education are •.. in a sense, singularly unlikely to do the things
that are necessary to lift public education on to the level of productive and
efficient functioning and operations-particularly as far as finances are concerned
-that they need to do. The reason for this is that they are so immediately
subject to tax-payer revolts, tax-payer resistance, tax-payer opposition. "When
given alternatives ••• between doing something that has to be done for the schools,
••• or yielding to the concentrated and intense focus of pressure of certain vested
interest groups in the community, they will opt not for education, but for the
groups. Rationalizing it all the way on the theory that, "We are the elected
representatives of people, and we have to find out what people think and then
do just that."
7. See J. CONANT, THE EDUCATION OF AMERICAN TEACHERS (1963).
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terns commensurate with their responsibilities. They frequently lack
a meaningful voice in determining the content of the courses they
are teaching or in selecting appropriate textbooks. Often they are not
free to formulate their own lesson plans or to modify them if they do
not produce desirable classroom responses. Seldom, if ever, do they
share a role in over-all curricular planning. A teacher who maintains
rigorous performance standards £or his pupils or strict rules of eligibility to participate in extracurricular activities £or which he is
responsible may be supported by his school board in the teeth of
parental complaints. But it is more likely that he will be forced to
relax his standards under threat of an adverse performance rating, a
transfer to the boondocks, or discharge. Teachers are frequently told
that they should accept responsibility £or their colleagues who "beat
the clock" or who are othenvise guilty of untoward behavior. Yet,
teachers typically have no voice in recruiting new colleagues or in
promotion and tenure decisions. The on-the-job freedom and authority of classroom teachers has been seriously curtailed by standardization of teaching procedures which are regimentally enforced.8
Most teachers have inadequate office space (if indeed they have an
office at all), and they have little or no secretarial help. Faculty
libraries are virtually unknown. Teachers are seldom involved in
decisions about the design or rehabilitation of physical plant or about
the mix of technology and manpower to be employed in the teaching
process.
In short, teachers in public elementary and secondary education
are the victims of a kind of one-dimensional professionalism: professional responsibility without professional authority. It is as if one
were to say to a doctor: "The health of the patient is in your hands,
but someone else will make the diagnosis and prescribe the therapy."
One prominent school board member has stated:
I think the miracle is that we have extracted from the teachers corps
of the United States the quality of performance that we have, given
the conditions that we have subjected them to-a condition of general servitude, I would describe it. They have lived in a condition
where they were told what to do, when to do it, how to do it, and
then excoriated for not having done the when, where, and how as
8. THE PURSUIT OF EXCELLENCE: EDUCATION AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA, REPORT V
at 24 (Rockefeller Bros. 1958):
Perhaps no profession has suffered such a general neglect of specialized
abilities as that of the teacher. Teachers at the pre-college level tend to be handled
as interchangeable units in educational assembly lines. The best teacher and the
poorest in a school may teach the same grade and subject [using the same teaching methods], use the same text book, handle the same number of students, get
paid the same salaries, and rise in salary at the same speed to the same ceiling.
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indicated. This is calculated, it seems to me, to squeeze the vitality
out of almost anyone, except the vegetable-the guy who comes into
teaching because he was a vegetable, and stays in it effectively because
he is.9
One junior high school teacher in a lower-middle-class neighborhood in Brooklyn, frustrated that her performance is judged more on
the basis of adherence to an approved lesson plan than on how much
her students learn, expressed the misgivings of many professionally
oriented teachers in urban school systems:
I have a conflict between the right thing to do to get recognition
[from the administration] and what I feel is the right thing to do
[for the students] .... Teaching is really in a sense like a performance. There ought to be more expressiveness and freedom in it ....
Vvhat I really want is to be treated as a professional-to be consulted
and trusted.10
The specific conditions that this teacher complained about are not
atypical in American education. Teachers must submit weekly lesson
plans for the approval of supervisors who frequently do not even take
the trouble to read them. Considerable time is devoted to minor
clerical chores such as taking attendance, filling out forms, and keeping records. Teachers are required to direct traffic in hallways between classes, and they are importuned never to sit down while
teaching a class. Supervisors roam the halls during class changes and
peer into classroom windows to enforce both of these rules strictly.
Worse, the principal maintains an informal espionage system wherein
teachers are encouraged to report on the activities of their fellow
teachers by the prospect of relief from unwanted nonteaching duties
such as cafeteria supervision. 11

III.

THE HARBINGERS OF REVOLUTION

Massachusetts,12 Michigan,13 New Jersey,14 New York,15 and
Wisconsin16 have recently enacted general statutes requiring public
9. Benton, supra note 6, at 265.
10. N.Y. Herald Tribune, Feb. 4, 1965, at 1, col. 3.
11. Id.
12. MASS • .ANN. LAws ch. 149, § 178 (Supp. 1967).
13. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.201-.216 (1967).
14. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:13A-1 to -11 (Supp. 1968), amending N.J. STAT• .ANN.
§§ 34: 13A-1 to -13 (1959).
15. N.Y. CIV. SERv. LAw §§ 200-12 (McKinney Supp. 1968). [The present version of
this law, as amended by a bill passed on March 4, 1969 (effective April 1, 1969), appears in GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT No. 288, at F-1 (March 17, 1969).)
16. Wxs. STAT. ANN. § 111.70 (municipal employees), §§ 111.80-.94 (state employees)
(Supp. 1969).
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employers, including school boards, to share their policy-making authority with organizations of their employees, including teachers.
Connecticut,17 Maryland, 18 Rhode Island, 19 and Washington20 have
passed special laws guaranteeing teachers the right to organize and
bargain collectively with school boards. Special statutes in California,21 Minnesota,22 and Oregon23 afford teachers the right to "meet
and confer" with local school boards. Moreover, collective negotiations between teacher organizations and local boards of education
exist extralegally in seven other states which include such major
cities as Chicago, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Kansas City,
Denver, and Washington, D.C. One respected observer has estimated
that by 1972 approximately eighty per cent of the nation's teachers
will be teaching in states with some type of collective bargaining
statute or in school districts with structured systems for collective
negotiations.24
During the last thirty years, collective bargaining in the private
sector has profoundly influenced both the mode of managerial decision-making and the substance of management decisions. Power-sharing between corporate executives and employee representatives is
now commonplace. Employers who once jealously guarded their
right to run their businesses unilaterally have resigned themselves to
bilateral decision-making on such matters as compensation levels,
fringe benefits, work loads, and other terms and conditions of employment. Often these areas of shared decision-making impinge upon
matters traditionally regarded as "management prerogatives"-for
example, the decision whether to subcontract. However, as great an
impact as the union movement has had in the private sector, few
observers would characterize the changes in the mode of decisionmaking as a managerial "revolution." Why, then, should one suppose
that power-sharing in the public sector would have a different-and
more profound-impact on management of the public educational
enterprise?
17. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 10-153(b) to (d) (Supp. 1969), §§ 10-153(e) to (f) (1967).
18. MD. ANN. CODE art. 77, § 175 (Supp. 1968).
19. R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-9.3-1 to -5 (1969).
20. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. tit. 41.56 (Supp. 1967).
21. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13080 (West 1969).
22. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 125.19-.26 (Supp. 1969).
23. ORE. REv. STAT. § 342.450 (Supp. 1968).
24. Lieberman, Collective Negotiations: Status and Trends, AM. SCHOOL BD. J., Oct.
1967, at 7.
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The answer lies in the aspirations and self-conceptions of teachers
generally. Professors in higher education have traditionally aspired
to the same degree of self-government that obtains in the entrepreneurial professions. Like lawyers and doctors, university professors
have sought to establish their own criteria for admission into the
profession and to fashion and enforce their own standards of good
practice. Within the universities, they have pressed for effective influence in policy decisions on admission standards, curriculum content,
degree requirements, grading standards, academic freedom, standards
for student conduct and discipline, and procedures for the appointment of department chairmen, deans, and presidents. Furthermore,
they have aspired to determine the conditions which affect the standards and quality of work performance-promotions, tenure, course
assignments, work schedules, work loads, allocation of space, and
secretarial help.25
Teachers in elementary and secondary education do not yet fully
share the same aspirations, probably because teaching at these levels
is still not a sufficiently rewarding occupation to attract and hold the
number of highly qualified persons necessary to achieve the level of
"professionalism" found in higher education.26 Elementary and secondary school teachers' salaries are not yet competitive with salaries
for other jobs involving comparable ability and length of training. 27
Promotional policy in most school systems is routine and depends
more on seniority (or favoritism) than merit. Top salaries are not
sufficiently far above the lowest salaries to constitute meaningful
incentives for staying in the profession. Teachers with more than
modest financial needs and responsibilities can solve their problems
only by becoming administrators or by leaving education altogether. 28
It is significant to note in this regard that teachers have not been
content to rest their case for salary increases on factors which are
usually considered to be of prime importance in collective bargaining generally-increases in the cost of living and comparisons with
settlements and trends in other trades and occupations. Rather, their
primary argument is that salary increases are necessary if the school
25. See AMERICAN AssOCIATION FOR HIGHER EDUCATION, TASK FORCE ON FACULTY
REPRESENTATION AND ACADEMIC NEGOTIATIONS, FACULTY PARTICIPATION IN ACADEMIC
GOVERNANCE 27-32 (1967). See also Brown, Collective Bargaining in Higher Education,
67 M1cH. L. R.Ev. 1067 (1969).
26. THE PURSUIT OF EXCELLENCE, supra note 8, at 23-26.
27. Gardner, National Goals in Education, in GOALS
(President's Commission on National Goals 1960).
28. THE PURSUIT OF EXCELLENCE, supra note 8, at 25-26.

FOR AMERICANS

18, 95-96
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district is to compete effectively in the market place for high-quality
beginning teachers and for the continued services of experienced
teachers. In the long run, they contend, this is the only way to reduce
the number of substandard teachers. Turnover statistics thus assume
critical importance in the bargaining process: How many teachers
have resigned in the past five years? Why did they resign? Where did
they go? Were they experienced or inexperienced? By whom were
they replaced? Surprisingly, since they publicly proclaim their commitment to excellence, many school boards are indifferent to such
data. Such basic techniques of personnel management as conducting exit interviews to determine the causes of turnover are rare.
Many school boards do not keep accurate and complete turnover
statistics at all. Others do so, but only for the purpose of ascertaining
how much money can be saved by replacing experienced teachers
with inexperienced ones; this is accomplished by discharging every
year a predetermined percentage of instructors who have not yet
achieved tenure.
In those school districts where it exists, collective bargaining has
already made a significant impact on these conditions. As a result of
the negotiations during the past five years, salaries and other compensation levels have improved dramatically, 29 and it is reasonable
to expect that these trends will continue. Particular emphasis will
probably be placed on widening the differential between top and
bottom salaries in order to encourage "career" teachers to remain in
the profession. As collective negotiation in education continues to
improve entering salaries and salary expectations, not only will the
number and quality of career teachers increase, but also the expectation levels and demands of teachers in elementary and secondary
education will grow geometrically. Teachers will identify more and
more with the "professional" objectives of their counterparts in
higher education, and they will argue for a more significant role in
the areas of managerial authority which have been occupied exclusively by school boards and superintendents.
Already the impact of this revolution has been felt in a number
of school districts. The recent grievance arbitration of Barnstable
Teachers Association v. Barnstable School Committee30 provides perhaps the most dramatic illustration of the impact of collective nego29. For a discussion of the increase in teachers' salaries in Michigan, see Rehmus.
supra note 2, at 924.
30. EDUCATORS NEGOTIATING SERVICES, Dec. 2, 1968, case no. 1130-0043-68 (Fallon,
arbitrator).
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tiations on the division of managerial authority in public education.
The aggrieved party, Edward F. Barry, had been employed as a high
school chemistry teacher since 1959. Sixty-seven students had taken
his course in college chemistry during the school year 1966-67; of
these sixty-seven students, six per cent had received A's, and twelve
per cent B's. At the other end of the scale, thirty per cent of the sixtyseven students had received D's, and thirteen per cent F's. During
the same marking period, students in other college preparatory
courses in the school had been marked on a so-called normal curve:
fourteen per cent of them had received A's, thirty-three per cent B's,
nineteen per cent D's, and four per cent F's. Since the better colleges
commonly regarded A's or B's as the only marks meriting college
certification, eighteen per cent of Barry's students had received certifying marks as compared with forty-seven per cent in other college
preparatory courses in which students had been graded on the
normal curve.
The principal of the high school, Paul J. Prescott, received a
number of parental complaints about Barry's grading system; he
communicated these complaints to Barry and asked him to consider
re-evaluating his marking system. While Barry did not foreclose this
possibility, he stated his opinion that students had achieved lower
grades in his chemistry class for two reasons: first, his standard for
median achievement was a level sufficiently high so that students
could compete successfully with students from other school systems
who were seeking admission to Ivy League colleges; and second,
some of the students who had been "assigned" to his class did not
belong in a college chemistry class in the first place.
When Barry subsequently refused to conform to the so-called
normal marking curve, Prescott sent him a memorandum pointing
out that for the past three years his distribution of marks had been
out of conformity with marks received by college preparatory students in other classes and from other instructors in the school. Accordingly, the principal ordered him "to revise your marking system
to bring it into line with the marks received by college preparatory
-students in other classes in the school."31 He also warned Barry that
his failure to comply with this order would be regarded "as an act of
insubordination.'' 32 Barry refused to comply with the order and filed
a grievance under the arbitration machinery of the collective bar31. Id.
32. Id.
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gammg contract between the teachers' association and the school
committee. Article II of this agreement contained familiar language:
"Except as otherwise provided in this agreement, the wages, hours,
and other conditions of employment applicable on the effective date
of this agreement shall continue to be so applicable unless there is
good justification for a change."33 The arbitrator found that the
method by which a teacher evaluates and grades his students is a
condition of his employment. He further found that Barry had followed his particular method of marking students based on examination results, homework, class participation, and lab work continuously since his employment in 1959. Accordingly, the arbitrator found
that it was a violation of article II for the school committee through
its agent, Prescott, to direct Barry to revise his marking system in
order to bring it into line with the normal curve used in other college ·preparatory classes. Thus, the arbitrator determined that Barry
did not have to comply with the principal's order.
Most faculty members in higher education would probably regard this case as noteworthy only as an outrageous attempt by an
antediluvian school administrator to interfere with a teacher's academic freedom. However, it will not be so regarded in elementary
and secondary education. Educators' Negotiating Services, which reports developments in collective negotiations in elementary and
secondary education, reproduced this decision and sent it to its subscribers with the following explanation: "This decision is likely to
have repercussions because of its serious threat to the authority of
principals to supervise and control the teaching activities of their
teachers." 34 Thus, what would be regarded as a threat to the authority of teachers in higher education is regarded as a threat to the
authority of principals in elementary and secondary education.
The revolution in public school management is making its impact felt in other areas traditionally regarded as the prerogatives of
local school boards and administrators. Some recent collective agreements negotiated between school boards and teacher organizations
provide for teacher involvement in recruiting new faculty members.
For example, one agreement in New York requires that teachers
elected by their colleagues at the school, subject, or departmental
level interview candidates for teaching positions during the recruit33. Id.
34. Id.
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ment process.35 Another teacher association in New York has proposed in current negotiations that a teacher selection committee be
established in each elementary school and in each department of each
secondary school. Under this system, no new teacher could be employed without the approval of two thirds of the members of the
appropriate teacher selection committee. Provisions such as these will
have an important effect in shifting the balance of managerial authority in favor of teachers and teacher organizations.
Teacher organizations have also pressed for contractual provisions outlining standards and procedures for judging the professional
competence of nontenure teachers. For example, one agreement on
Long Island provides for something akin to the "peer" group evaluation of teaching ability which is commonplace in higher education.
The contract specifically requires that any evaluation of a teacher's
professional ability must include the judgment of a person of recognized competence in the same field. Another teacher organization
has proposed that "[n]o teacher shall be denied tenure unless such
decision is approved by a vote of two-thirds of all of the members of
the appropriate teacher or department selection committee."
Other collective agreements contain provisions which are intended to improve the quality of the educational program. For
instance, several agreements in the New England area require the
school administration to employ a certain number of specialists,
such as psychologists, speech therapists, remedial reading teachers,
and other personnel specially trained to improve the quality of educational services available to "different" children-those who are
either disadvantaged or gifted. One agreement in Connecticut calls
for the school board to employ a minimum of one hundred new staff
members for the purpose of improving the quality of education in
music, art, and courses for non-English speaking students. A Massachusetts agreement provides for the establishment of a joint faculty
committee which is charged, among other things, with the development of plans for designing and equipping new and remodeled
school facilities.
Teacher involvement in the development of curriculum and
other educational programs is increasingly common. One contract
in New York calls for a faculty curriculum group in each school
building, a curriculum committee to coordinate curricular offerings
35. This, and the following examples, are drawn from agreements in which the
author was the chief negotiator.-Ed.
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from kindergarten through the twelfth grade, and a curriculum development council to study and make recommendations on systemwide curricular offerings and priorities. A contract in a different
school system establishes a joint educational development committee
for the purpose of establishing major programs, setting priorities,
developing and implementing new curricular offerings, and evaluating both new and existing programs. Each faculty member on the
committee is given released time from teaching chores to attend to
his committee responsibilities. The same contract also creates subject matter councils at the district level, and curricular practice and
te}f.tbook selection committees in each department of the secondary
schools and at each grade level in the elementary schools for the
purpose of coordinating curricular developments within the school
system.
At least two agreements on Long Island provide for the election
of department chairmen by the members of each affected secondary
school department. One teacher association is currently proposing
the establishment of separate promotion committees in each school
building as well as a district-wide promotion committee. Under this
proposal, no person could be promoted to the chairmanship of a
department without the approval of three fourths of the members of
the committee in his building. Moreover, the person promoted
would lose his new job during the second half of his third year of
service unless the committee recommended his retention by a threefourths vote. The same procedures would apply to the selection of
persons to fill district-wide promotional vacancies, including the
superintendent's job. Implementation of the proposal would mean
in effect, that a superintendent could not be selected without the
approval of the teachers' representatives; moreover, a superintendent
would be dismissed at the end of his third year unless the teachers
agreed to his retention.
IV.

SOME IMPLICATIONS OF ORGANIZED TEACHER INVOLVEMENT
IN PUBLIC SCHOOL MANAGEMENT

Faculty involvement in the decision-making process in the public
schools can be expected to improve teacher salary levels, fringe benefits, and working conditions with an attendant improvement in the
quality of teachers. It should also produce improved supervision,
modernization of personnel practices, more efficient management,
and tighter budget-making procedures and budgetary control. More-
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over, teacher participation should substantially reduce the risk of
political interference in local school management-hiring administrators or creating administrative sinecures on a patronage basis.
Finally, it should result in a greater public awareness of what really
goes on in the public schools.
On the other side of the ledger, the shift in decision-making authority may increase the risk that excellence in teacher performance
-individual efforts that transcend established norms or deviate from
standardized practice-will be discouraged or repressed in favor of
uniformity of performance and equality of compensation. There
may be increasing pressure for the use of mechanical or quantitative
formulae under which, illustratively, equal hours of work plus equal
seniority plus equal credits means equal pay. Collective bargaining
inherently subjects many policy determinations to the rule of the
organizational majority, and majority rule often reflects deep suspicion of individual initiative or advantage. Thus, collective negotiations could have an adverse effect on teachers with special ability.36
It is too early to predict, even tentatively, whether teacher participation in the management of the public educational enterprise
will result in more imaginative decision-making in curriculum
planning, teaching methodology, and other aspects of educational
programming in the public schools. The experience in higher education does not support the belief that faculty "input" in such decisionmaking processes necessarily produces salutary results. The push for
innovation and experimentation in higher education often seems to
come from the administration of the institution, typically in response
to external pressures. Faculty resistance to change, if it occurs, may
be the result of inertia or simply differing evaluations of the merits
of particular proposals.
State and national teacher organizations do devote a large percentage of their resources to research in ways to improve the quality
of public education. It seems realistic to suggest that procedures for
bilateral policy formulation through collective negotiations may
prove to be an effective vehicle for encouraging the kind of workplace involvement of teachers that is a sine qua non of effective
experimentation.
Most of the evidence in the early stages of the teacher revolution
indicates that the cooperative development of educational policies by
36. Of course, this can happen under the present relationships. See text accompanying notes 7-11 supra.
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school boards, superintendents, and local teacher organizations will
come slowly and with travail. Both parties can be expected to be
doctrinaire and emotional in their respective positions on the question of what subjects are bargainable, what subjects are managerial
prerogatives, and what subjects are teacher prerogatives. Moreover,
even when there is a disposition to cooperate, there may be conflicts
of interest which make accommodations extremely difficult. For
instance, an innovation-minded school board may wish to experiment with a high school arranged on the model of Oxford College,
with four separate "houses," each presided over by a "house master."
Such a proposal requires the creation of several new jobs. The school
board may subscribe abstractly to the principle that promotional
vacancies should be filled from within the school system and that
seniority should govern where the merit of several applicants is
equal. Still, it may seek to describe the requirements for the new
jobs so that senior teaching personnel, whom the board feels might
lay the dead hand of tradition and orthodoxy on the experiment,
could not qualify. The teacher organization, while it may lend its
full support to the experiment in principle, may be compelled by
the self-interest of its members to insist upon a job description which
maximizes the chance that senior members of the incumbent staff
will qualify for the new positions. This is particularly true since
teachers, like other employees, commonly regard merit as a euphemism for favoritism.
Two other implications of organized teacher involvement in local
public school management deserve brief comment. First, the fact
that teachers by reason of their education, psychology, and traditions
have an interest in the quality of the educational enterprise is relevant in terms of avoiding or resolving bargaining impasses. Thirdparty intervenors-mediators, fact finders, or arbitrators-will usually be in error if they cavalierly assume that proposals which
manifest this interest are mere "window-dressing" for public beguilement. This is not to say that all proposals of teacher organizations
will be altruistic. But there will usually be a blend of self-concern
and "professional" concern which is not characteristic of collective
bargaining in many other fields. Every reasonable effort should be
made to avoid retarding serious consideration of proposals which
reflect professional concern over the quality of education on the
ground that the issues are management prerogatives and therefore
nonbargainable. Second, the development of strong local teacher
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organizations will greatly increase the likelihood of visible conflicts
between teachers and certain pressure groups within the community.
Four years ago I made the following statement:
[O]ne of the most serious problems facing urban schools today is
the pressure generated by militant, well organized lay groups on
school boards and superintendents. The most dramatic and explosive pressures (although not the only ones) arise from the conflict
between groups who would achieve racial balance at the sacrifice of
all other educational values and groups who think that the neighborhood school principle was divinely ordained. The danger is that
policies on such difficult and divisive matters will ultimately be
made, not on the basis of carefully reasoned judgments by those
persons who are responsible for the educational program, but on the
basis of which group can out-demonstrate, out-litigate, and out-shout
the other. What school boards and superintendents need, I suggest,
is a countervailing force which will effectively offset such pressures
and play a major role in keeping the development, formulation,
and administration of school policy in responsible hands.37

The pressure groups have different objectives today than they had
when that statement was made. But the conflicts are just as severe,
and the need for a countervailing force is just as great. A strong
teachers' organization profoundly involved in public school management can provide such a force.
The current furor in New York City over "decentralization" or
"community control" of the schools is a dramatic illustration of the
point.38 The assertions by organized groups of parents-whether in
Scarsdale or in Ocean Hill-Brownsville-that the neighborhood public schools are "theirs" and that they must have total control over
who is hired, what they teach, and what methods they use are
squarely opposed to the highest aspirations of public school teachers.
The pressure for community control being applied by the leadership of racial and ethnic groups in the affected neighborhoods merely
compounds the conflict. If teaching is truly a profession, teachers
must be recognized as having a special competence to help define
the standards of their "practice" and the quality of service provided
to their "clientele."
The history of public education seems to indicate that neither
37. Address by Donald H. Wollett, Spring Field Conference, University of Southern
California, March 10, 1965.
38. See Mayer, The Full and Sometimes Very Surprising Story of Ocean Hill, The
Teacher's Union and the Teachers Strikes of 1968, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1969, § 6
(Magazine), at 18.
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school boards nor other essentially political agencies, standing alone,
can realistically be relied upon to provide a meaningful domain of
academic freedom for public school teachers. Teachers can achieve
this objective only through the development of strong local organizations which are capable of mobilizing and using power in appropriate ways. Such teacher organizations can give school boards caught
between the needs of education and the pressures of public interest
groups the courage and confidence to "opt" for education. Where
teacher organizations and school boards are able to engage in constructive collective bargaining, public school management will indeed be revolutionized in ways which hold great promise for improvement of the educational enterprise.

